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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION
In recent years courts and legislatures have accepted strict tort
liability as a basis for recovery in products liability actions.1 As a
result, courts have had to consider whether and in what ways a
strict liability suit differs from a traditional negligence action.2
Historically courts permitted punitive damages m any negligence
1. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1962), was the first major products liability case m which a court held a manufacturer
strictly liable for injuries caused by its defective product. Although the court could have
reached the same result on traditional negligence or breach of warranty grounds, it adopted
a strict liability theory in order to relieve the plaintiff of proving manufacturer negligence in
the design, manufacture, or distribution processes. Id. at -, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
701. Following the same reasoning, the American Law Institute promulgated § 402A of the
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, which provides:
Special Liability of Seller for Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product m a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Jurisdictions adopting § 402A or other theories of strict products liability are: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mary-
land, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Olo, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Pu-
erto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 1 PROD. LLn. REP. (CCH) H 4015-16 (1979).
States refusing to adopt the theory of strict liability in products liability cases are: Dela-
ware, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming. Id.
2. Substituting strict liability for negligence as a theory of liability in products liability
suits presents the question of whether traditional defenses, such as contributory negligence
or assumption of risk, are appropriate. See, e.g., Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 295 Ala. , 335
So. 2d 128 (1976). Courts also must consider the propriety of punitive damages in the strict
liability context. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, cert. dented, 101
S. Ct. 320 (1980).
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suit when the defendant's conduct was particularly gross or reck-
less,3 and most courts today allow punitive damages in products
liability actions involving negligence when the defendant's conduct
meets the same standard.4 Because the theory of strict products
liability focuses on the defective condition of a product rather than
on the culpable conduct of its manufacturer, 5 a products liability
suit based solely on strict liability raises the question of whether
damages designed to punish wrongful conduct are appropriate.
Scholars have vigorously debated the issue,0 and courts in a grow-
3. See generally D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9 (1973); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAM-
AGES ch. 10 (1935); Belli, Punitive Damages-Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in
Present-Day Society, 49 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 1 (1980); Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort
Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931); Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases,
21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216 (1960); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 517 (1957).
4. See, e.g., Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398
(1967); Ostopowitz v. William S. Merrill Co., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1967, at 21, cols. 3-4 (Sup.
CL).
5. The plaintiff in a strict products liability suit need show only that the product was in
a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, the seller regularly
sells such products, and the product reached the consumer without substantial change. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The degree of care exercised by the manufac-
turer or seller is irrelevant. Id. § 402A(2).
6. Commentators opposed to punitive damages in strict products liability suits include:
Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11
FORUM 57 (1975); Coccia & Morrissey, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases
Should Not Be Allowed, 1978 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 46; Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine
Which Should Be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE
DAMAGES 4 (1969); Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, in id. at 15; Fulton,
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 15 FORUM 117 (1979); Ghiardi, Should Puni-
tive Damages Be Abolished? -A Statement for the Affirmative, in A.B.A. INS., NEGL. &
Comp. L. 282 (1965); Ghiardi & Koehn, Punitive Damages in Strict Liability Cases, 61
MARQ. L. REV. 245 (1977); Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability for Design and
Punitive Damages-The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 595
(1974); Hoenig, Products Liability and Punitive Damages, 687 INS. L.J. 198 (1980);
Snyman, The Validity of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Cases, 44 INS. COUNS. J.
402 (1977); Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39 INS. COUNS. J. 300 (1972).
Commentators favoring punitive damages in strict products liability litigation include:
Abramson, Punitive Damages in Aircraft Accident Cases-A Debate, 11 FORUM 50 (1975);
Igoe, Punitive Damages-An Analytical Perspective, 14 TRIAL 48 (Nov. 1978); Igoe, Puni-
tive Damages in Products Liability Cases Should Be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 24
(1978); Kreindler, Punitive Damages in Aviation Litigation-An Essay, 8 CUM. L. REV. 607
(1978); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257
(1976); Rheingold, The MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litiga-
tion, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116 (1968); Robinson & Kane, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Cases, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 139 (1978); Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products
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ing number of jurisdictions have confronted the problem. Judicial
resolution of the issue is not uniform, and the courts advance a
variety of reasons to support or deny punitive damage awards.7
The issue of the appropriateness of punitive damages in strict
products liability suits raises serious policy considerations. Strict
liability, the most rapidly developing area of torts,8 increasingly
has replaced negligence and breach of warranty as the basis for
products liability actions." The availability of punitive damages in
strict products liability suits may increase the attractiveness of the
strict liability theory to injured plaintiffs because plaintiffs will be
compensated more fully for costly and time-consuming litigation.
Yet, if courts liberally award punitive damages, a defendant manu-
facturer" whose defective product injured a large number of per-
sons may be pushed to financial rmn. Scholars and jurists disagree
about whose interests merit greater protection. This Note will sur-
vey judicial determinations of whether punitive damages are ap-
propriate in strict products liability actions, and, if punitive dam-
ages are appropriate, what circumstances merit such an award.1"
COURT DECISIONS
Despite the recent proliferation of products liability litigation
premised on strict liability, relatively few courts have ruled on the
Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. RE v. 613 (1972); 1980 DET. C.L. REv. 647; 33 Sw. L.J. 1117 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d
1008 (5th Cir. 1980); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F Supp. 255 (E.D.
Pa. 1976); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621
(Alaska 1980); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 320
(1980).
8. See W KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODucTs LIABILITY 66-67 (1979).
9. Id. at 67. Plaintiffs prefer the strict products liability theory over negligence or breach
of warranty theories because plaintiffs need not prove negligent conduct by or privity of
contract with a seller. See id. at 118-46; W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Because privity is not a requirement for a strict products liability suit, a plaintiff
may sue all the parties in the distribution chain, from the manufacturer through the whole-
saler to the retailer. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965). To sim-
plify discussion, this Note will refer primarily to the manufacturer as defendant.
11. The scope of this Note is limited to products liability actions involving strict liability
theory and therefore does not discuss products liability suits based solely on negligence or
breach of warranty. For an exhaustive discussion of products liability suits involving all
three theories of recovery, see Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74
MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976).
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propriety of punitive damage recovery in such suits. 12 Many plain-
tiffs who seek punitive damages in products liability litigation base
their actions on negligence rather than strict liability,13 and those
plaintiffs who allege strict liability often include negligence, breach
of warranty, and fraud as additional bases of liability 14 When
courts review punitive damage awards in such multi-theory cases,
they often consider only whether punitive damages are permissible
12. Reported products liability cases in which the plaintiff sought punitive damages in-
clude: Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th
Cir. 1980); d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Johnson v.
Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillhain v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d
132 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. dented, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479
F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F Supp. 384 (E.D. Wis. 1976);
Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Commer-
cial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976); Drayton v. Jiffee
Chem. Corp., 395 F Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Vollert v. Sumia Corp., 389 F Supp.
1348 (D. Hawaii 1975); Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska
1980); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., - Cal. App. 3d -, 74 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); Sabich v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976); G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); Barth v. B.F Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.
App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, No. 80-767 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. Aug. 12, 1981); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636
(1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v.
Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d
727, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.
App. 1978); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981); Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
13. See, e.g., Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978); Knip-
pen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Walbrun v. Berkel, Inc., 433 F Supp. 385 (E.D. Wis. 1976);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney, 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. dented, 416
U.S. 961 (1974); Hafner v. Guerlain, Inc., 34 App. Div. 2d 162, 310 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1970).
14. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 913 (1976); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Upjohn Co., 409 F Supp. 453 (W.D. La.
1976); Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 395 F Supp. 1081 (N.D. Ohio 1975); Sabich v. Out-
board Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976); G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rpt. 218 (1975); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); Barth v. B.F Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.
App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253
N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970); American Laundry Mach.
Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980); Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d
15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
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in products liability actions based on negligence in order to avoid
the more difficult question of whether punitive damages are appro-
priate in suits based solely on strict liability.a5
Recovery Based Solely on Strict Liability
Courts m at least four jurisdictions have upheld punitive damage
awards in products liability suits based solely on strict liability. In
Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,"6 the Supreme Court of Alaska first
considered matters of policy before holding that punitive damage
claims were permissible in strict products liability actions. Noting
an exhaustive article by David G. Owen, the foremost advocate of
punitive damages in the strict products liability context,17 the
court stated that.punitive damages would have a strong deterrent
effect on manufacturers when a defective product caused numerous
minor injuries to people who could not afford to sue if punitive
damages were not available, when payment of compensatory dam-
15. See, e.g., Forest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720
(1981); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, _, 412 A.2d 407, 416
(1980); Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
16. 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980).
17. Owen, supra note 11. Professor Owen is co-editor of the casebook, PRODucTs LIABIL-
rrY AND SAFETY (1980). He believes that the traditional functions of punitive damages, pun-
ishment of wrongful conduct and deterrence of similar conduct in the future, are as appro-
priate in the modern products liability context as in other torts for which punitive damages
customarily have been allowed. Punitive damages punish a manufacturer by diminishing
any unfair competitive advantage it may have gained by making a cheaper but more danger-
ous product. At the same time, punitive damages deter other manufacturers from producing
unsafe products by providing an example of the kind of conduct that is unacceptable and by
giving an economic incentive to manufacturers to correct their defective products. Owen,
supra note 11, at 1257, 1277-87.
Professor Owen rejects the argument that strict products liability theory, which focuses
on the condition of the product, is conceptually incompatible with the doctrine of punitive
damages, which focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer. He points out that strict liabil-
ity theory is a liability doctrine designed to compensate a plaintiff who meets the requisite
burden of proof, but strict liability does not limit the remedies available to the plaintiff if
the injury was attributable to the aggravated conduct of the manufacturer. In a strict prod-
ucts liability suit, a plaintiff can prove the product was defective to establish the defen-
dant's liability and also make a showing of the defendant's culpable conduct to support a
punitive damage award. Id. at 1268-70.
Professor Owen proposes a special standard for punitive damage recovery in products
liability actions: "Punitive damages may be assessed against the manufacturer of a product
injuring the plaintiff if the injury is attributable to conduct that reflects a flagrant indiffer-
ence to the public safety." Id. at 1367.
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ages by the manufacturer would cost less than correcting the de-
fect, or when a reckless manufacturer had gained an unfair advan-
tage over more responsible competitors.18 The court then identified
the legal standard for punitive damage recovery, which in Alaska is
section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: "outrageous
[conduct] such as acts done with malice or bad motives or a reck-
less indifference to the interests of another." '19 Applying this stan-
dard in the products liability context, the court held that if a
plaintiff could prove that the manufacturer knew its product was
defective, was aware of resulting injuries or deaths, and neverthe-
less continued to market the product in reckless disregard of the
public's safety, a jury could award punitive damages.20 Because the
acts of the defendant manufacturer fit this standard, the court af-
firmed the jury's finding of "reckless indifference," but reduced the
amount of the lower court award.2 1
The Supreme Court of Minnesota also addressed the propriety
of punitive damages in suits based solely on strict products liabil-
ity theory in Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.22 In Gryc the court
adopted Professor Owen's rationale that punitive damages consti-
tute an appropriate device to prevent manufacturers from market-
18. 594 P.2d at 46-49.
19. Id. at 46 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19,
1973)). Section 908 provides:
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal dam-
ages, awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and
to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because
of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider
the character of the defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the
plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the
defendant.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979).
Comment b discusses the character of the defendant's conduct. Punitive damages may be
awarded only for acts involving a bad motive or a reckless indifference to the interests of
others. Punitive damages are not given for mere carelessness. Id. Comment b.
20. 594 P.2d at 46.
21. Id. at 48-49. At trial the jury awarded $2,895,000 in punitive damages, but on appeal
the supreme court reduced the award to $250,000. On rehearing, the court modified its rul-
ing and raised the award to $500,000. 615 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska 1980), modifying 594 P.2d
38 (Alaska 1979).
22. 297 N.W.2d 727, cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
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Ing defective products in "flagrant disregard of the public
safety."2 The court expressed concern for the possibility of
overpunishing a manufacturer that is potentially liable to many
plaintiffs,2 4 but stated that if consideration is given to the manu-
facturer's wealth and the degree to which it already had been pun-
ished, excessive verdicts would not result.2 5
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the standard used by the
trial court when it reviewed the punitive damage award of
$1,000,000:26 the defendant must act "maliciously or in a willful or
wanton manner. '27 A wanton act is one committed in "reckless dis-
regard of the rights of others, evincing reckless indifference to con-
sequences to the life or limb or health of another."28 Applying this
standard to the facts of the case, the court found that the evidence
supported the punitive damage award even though the defendant
had complied with federal safety regulations in the manufacture of
its product.29 The evidence showed that although the defendant
knew the federal safety test to be so unreliable that indisputably
dangerous products could pass it,30 the defendant did not develop
more accurate safety indicators of its own. These facts, coupled
with the defendant's failure to warn of the danger and refusal to
reduce the hazard of its product, warranted the jury's substantial
23. Id. at 733 (quoting Owen, supra note 11, at 1258-60).
24. Id. at 740-41. The undesirability of financially ruining manufacturers through nu-
merous large punitive damage awards is the most frequently raised argument against puni-
tive damages in products liability suits. See Coccia & Morrisey, supra note 6; Fulton, supra
note 6; Hoening, supra note 6; Snyman, supra note 6; Tozer, supra note 6. At least one
court has accepted this argument. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832
(2d Cir. 1967).
25. 297 N.W.2d at 741. Professor Owen suggests that when determining the amount of
punitive damages a jury should consider, among other factors, the financial condition of the
manufacturer and the probable effect of a particular judgment, and the total civil punish-
ment the manufacturer probably would receive from other lawsuits. Owen, supra note 11, at
1319.
26. 297 N.W.2d at 739. The court noted that in 1978 the Minnesota legislature had
changed the legal standard for punitive damage recovery, but ruled that the former stan-
dard was appropriate for this case, which originally was tried before the change in the law.
Id. at 739 n.6.
27. Id. at 738 n.5.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 734-35.
30. Id. at 734. The flammability test was so unreliable that newspaper print would pass
with a 48% margin of safety. Id.
19811
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punitive damage award. 1
In Grnmshaw v. Ford Motor Co.,3 2 a products liability suit based
on negligence and strict liability, the California Court of Appeal
held that an injured plaintiff could recover punitive damages in a
strict products liability suit. The court reasoned that because both
government safety standards and the criminal law had failed to
protect consumers from defective products, the punitive damage
remedy was necessary to deter manufacturer misconduct.3 The
court applied the standard for punitive damage recovery set forth
in section 3294 of the California Civil Code, which authorizes puni-
tive damages where the defendant's acts constituted "oppression,
fraud, or malice. ' 4 Interpreting "malice" to include conduct
"evincing callous and conscious disregard of public safety by those
who manufacture and market mass produced articles, '3 5 the court
found the $3,500,000 punitive damage award to be amply sup-
ported by the evidence. The manufacturer had shown callous indif-
ference to public safety in marketing a product that its own tests
had shown to be highly dangerous. Although the manufacturer
could have corrected the defect at minimal cost, it made a con-
scious decision not to do so." Calling the manufacturer's conduct
"reprehensible," the court held that the $3,500,000 punitive dam-
age award was not excessive.3 7
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently upheld awards of punitive
damages in Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp.,"5 a strict prod-
ucts liability suit brought by two plaintiffs injured in the same ac-
cident. Without discussing the narrow issue of the propriety of pu-
nitive damages in products liability litigation, the court stated that
31. Id. at 741.
32. - Cal. App. 3d -, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
33. Id. at _, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
34. Id. at._, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 383. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1981) provides:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where
the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in
addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example
and by way of punishing the defendant.
Id.
35. - Cal. App. 3d at -, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
36. Id. at _, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
37. Id. at ., 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
38. 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
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Ohio law always had permitted punitive damages in tort cases in-
volving "fraud, malice, or insult."39 Citing Columbus Finance Inc.
v. Howard,40 the court said that "intentional, reckless, wanton,
willful and gross acts which cause injury to person or property"
could constitute malice.41 In the products liability context, manu-
facturer conduct manifesting a "flagrant indifference to the possi-
bility that the product might expose consumers to unreasonable
risks of harm" could support an award of punitive damages.42 Be-
cause the manufacturer represented its product as "tough and reli-
able" without having performed safety tests on it, the court upheld
the punitive damage awards of $100,000 and $1,000,000. 41
Recovery Based on Multiple Theories of Liability
Courts in other jurisdictions also have upheld punitive damage
awards in products liability suits based on multiple theories of lia-
bility Typically the plaintiff alleged some combination of strict i-
ability, breach of warranty, negligence, and fraud as alternative ba-
ses of liability, and the jury returned a general verdict, finding the
defendant liable. When the jury returned a general verdict, the
court could not determine which theory served as the basis for the
jury's finding, or whether all of the theories supported the jury's
conclusion. Because the jury may have based its finding on the
strict liability theory alone, the court's subsequent allowance of a
punitive damage award was at least an implicit holding that puni-
tive damages are appropriate in strict products liability cases.
In Moore v. Jewel Tea Co.,44 a products liability suit based on
strict liability and negligence, the jury returned a general verdict
against the defendant, awarding $900,000 in compensatory and
$10,000 in punitive damages. Without discussing whether punitive
damages were appropriate when strict liability had been a possible
basis for the jury's finding of liability, the Illinois Court of Appeals
39. Id. at 657 (citing Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277 (1859)).
40. 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654 (1975) (punitive damages not allowed for judg-
ment creditor's wrongful execution).
41. 67 Ohio St. 2d at -, 424 N.E.2d at 579.
42. Id.
43. Id. at -, 424 N.E.2d at 582.
44. 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), afl'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103
(1970).
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affirmed the punitive damage award.45 The court identified willful
and wanton conduct as the standard for punitive damage recovery
and interpreted this standard to include conduct where "the fail-
ure to exercise care is so gross that it shows a lack of regard for the
safety of others. '46 Under this standard, the court concluded that
the defendant's knowledge of the dangerous propensities of its
product, coupled with its repeated failure to warn consumers,
presented a jury question as to willful and wanton behavior.4 7 Ac-
cordingly, the court did not disturb the jury's punitive damage
award."8
Similar conduct by the manufacturer in Gillham v. Admiral
Corp.49 led the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit to uphold a punitive damage award of $100,000, reversing the
district court's judgment non obstante verdicto m favor of the de-
fendant manufacturer. At trial the plaintiff pleaded the alternative
theories of strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, and
the jury returned a general verdict as to liability. Without discus-
sion, the appellate court assumed that Ohio law permitted a puni-
tive damage award in such a case.5 0 The court stated that a puni-
tive damage award required a finding of "fraud, insult, or malice,"
but malice could be inferred from conduct and surrounding cir-
cumstances. 51 Conduct giving rise to an inference of malice in-
cluded "reckless, wanton, willful and gross acts which cause injury
to person or property. ' 52 The court concluded that the manufac-
turer's knowledge of the grave danger posed by its product and its
failure to warn consumers or redesign the product were sufficient
grounds to permit an inference of malice.53
In Rinker v. Ford Motor Co.,5 another strict liability and negli-
45. Id. at 147, 253 N.E.2d at 654.
46. Id. at 136, 253 N.E.2d at 648-49 (citing Madison v. Wigal, 118 Ill. App. 2d 564, 153
N.E.2d 90 (1958)).
47. Id. at 136-37, 253 N.E.2d at 649.
48. Id. at 146, 253 N.E.2d at 653-54.
49. 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
50. Id. at 109.
51. Id. at 108.
52. Id. (quoting Columbus Fin., Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 184, 327 N.E.2d 654,
658 (1975)).
53. Id. at 109.
54. 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1978). Rinker is discussed in 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 298.
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gence suit in which the jury returned a general verdict, the Mis-
souri Court of Appeals upheld a punitive damage award of
$460,000. Although the court did not consider the narrow issue of
punitive damages and strict products liability theory, it discussed
the propriety of punitive damage awards in products liability suits
generally 55 After noting Irofessor Owen's article and decisions in
other jurisdictions,56 the court stated that punishment and deter-
rence were as much needed in the products liability area as in the
more traditional torts.57 The court rejected the argument that a
manufacturer potentially liable to many plaintiffs would be overly
punished by multiple punitive damage awards, pointing out that
both trial and appellate courts in Missouri had means for control-
ling excessive jury awards.5
Having establisl~ed the propriety of punitive damages in prod-
ucts liability suits, the court applied the standard for punitive
damage recovery outlined in the Missouri Approved Jury Instruc-
tions: the defendant's conduct must show "complete indifference
to or conscious disregard for the safety of others. '59 Evidence that
the defendant had notice of injuries caused by its defective auto-
mobile but took no steps to warn owners or recall the automobiles
supported the jury's finding of a "conscious disregard for the safety
of others."60
In other products liability cases, courts allowed the plaintiffs to
claim punitive damages, but for various reasons the punitive dam-
age issue never reached the jury. In Drake v. Wham-O Manufac-
turing Co.,"1 a suit based on strict products liability, negligence,
55. 567 S.W.2d at 667-69.
56. Id. at 668-69. The court cited Gillhain v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Rogrnsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1967); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975);
Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974); and Toole v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). 567 S.W.2d at 667-
69.
57. 567 S.W.2d at 668.
58. Id. at 669. Generally, a trial judge can require a plaintiff to choose between remitting
a portion of the punitive damage award or undergoing a new trial, and an appellate court
can order remittitur or a new trial if the verdict is clearly excessive. See Owen, supra note
11, at 1321.
59. 567 S.W.2d at 667 (quoting Mo. APPROVED JURY I-STR. § 10.02).
60. Id. at 668.
61. 373 F Supp. 608 (E.D. Wis. 1974).
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and breach of implied warranty, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin permitted the plaintiff to
amend her complaint to include a claim for punitive damages. In
response to the defendant's argument that punitive damages were
logically inconsistent with strict liability theory, the court acknowl-
edged that because the elements of proof for strict products liabil-
ity under section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts did
not address the manufacturer's conduct, facts alleged on a strict
liability theory alone would not support a punitive damage claim.
If, however, the plaintiff alleged additional facts demonstrating the
manufacturer's wanton or reckless behavior, the court would per-
mit the punitive damage clam. 2f Shortly after this ruling, the de-
fendant settled the suit for $65,000.3
Six years after the Drake decision, the Supreme Court of Wis-
consm clarified the circumstances under which punitive damages
could be recovered in products liability actions. In Wangen v. Ford
Motor Co.,6 4 a consolidated products liability suit brought by per-
sonal injury plaintiffs and wrongful death plaintiffs, the court held
that: punitive damages are recoverable in products liability actions
based on either strict liability or negligence; punitive damages are
recoverable in survivors suits, but not in wrongful death actions;
and punitive damages are recoverable by parents in actions for loss
of society and companionship of a child.65 In a detailed discussion,
the court rejected the argument that punitive damage awards in
products liability cases cause undesirable social consequences by
financially ruining many businesses. The court pointed to studies
showing that the number of cases in which punitive damages are
awarded is minimal 66 and concluded that punitive damages are as
much needed in the products liability field as in any other area of
tort law to punish and deter socially unacceptable conduct.67
To recover punitive damages in Wisconsin, a plaintiff must
demonstrate manufacturer conduct "showing a reckless indiffer-
62. Id. at 610. Professor Owen refutes the incompatibility argument following the same
reasoning as the court. See note 17 supra.
63. Owen, supra note 11, at 1327 n.333.
64. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
65. Id. at _, 294 N.W.2d at 441.
66. Id. at _, 294 N.W.2d at 453-62.
67. Id. at _, 294 N.W.2d at 453.
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ence to or disregard of the rights of others." '68 In addition, the
plaintiff must prove such misconduct by "clear, satisfactory, and
convincing" evidence. 9 Having clarified the circumstances under
which a jury may award punitive damages in products liability
cases, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's denial of the
manufacturer's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for punitive
damages, and remanded the case for trial."h
The District Court of Appeal of Florida recently decided in
American Motors Corp. v. Ellis71 that a plaintiff may recover puni-
tive damages m a strict products liability case. At trial the plaintiff
alleged both strict liability and negligence as bases for liability and
claimed punitive damages. In reviewing the trial court's directed
verdict for the manufacturer on the punitive damage claim, the ap-
pellate court quoted approvingly from the Wisconsin Supreme
Court's decision in Wangen, which allowed punitive damage claims
in products liability suits based on either strict liability or negli-
gence.72 The court then identified the standard for punitive dam-
age recovery as "willfulness, recklessness, maliciousness, outra-
geous conduct, oppression or fraud."73 Because the evidence
showed that the manufacturer was aware of the dangerous defect
in its product before marketing and refused to correct the problem
in order to save money, the claim for punitive damages presented a
question for the jury.74 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's ruling and ordered a new trial. 5
Courts m two other jurisdictions have held that punitive damage
claims are appropriate in multi-theory products liability cases. The
plaintiff in Vollert v. Summa Corp.76 alleged strict liability, negli-
gence, and breach of warranty against the manufacturer of a defec-
tive helicopter. In a memorandum opinion and order, the United
States District Court for the District of Hawaii ruled that the pu-
68. Id. at _, 294 N.W.2d at 442.
69. Id. at _, 294 N.W.2d at 458.
70. Id. at _, 294 N.W.2d at 467.
71. 403 So. 2d 459 (1981).
72. Id. at 467.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 468.
75. Id. at 469.
76. 389 F Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
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nitive damage claim was proper.77 The court discussed the danger
of excessively punishing a manufacturer potentially liable to many
plaintiffs, but decided that the Supreme Court of Hawaii would
not bar a punitive damage claim "simply because there might be
other suits filed against defendant. '7 8
In Casrell v. Altec Industries, Inc.7 9 and Atkins v. American
Motor Corp.,80 the Supreme Court of Alabama adopted the "ex-
tended manufacturer's liability doctrine" to serve as the basis for
liability in products liability actions in Alabama. According to this
doctrine, a manufacturer, supplier, or seller who marketed a prod-
uct not reasonably safe for its intended use would be negligent as a
matter of law.8' The fault of the manufacturer was in marketing a
defective product that caused injury to person or property.8 2 As
long as a causal relation existed between the manufacturer's con-
duct and the defective product, the manufacturer would be liable
because it "created an unreasonable risk of harm."8
According to the Supreme Court of Alabama, the practical dis-
tinction between the extended manufacturer's liability doctrine
and strict liability theory is that Alabama's doctrine of extended
liability retains the traditional focus on the defendant's conduct,
and thus allows the defenses of contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk.84 The court stated that the new doctrine could
serve as the basis of a wrongful death action as well as a personal
injury suit.85 In wrongful death actions in Alabama, the jury may
award a plaintiff damages to punish a defendant and deter it and
others from similar future conduct. 6 Thus, at least in wrongful
death actions, punitive damages may be recovered even when the
basis of the suit is the extended liability doctrine. In addition, be-
cause the new doctrine retains the concept of fault, it is concep-
77. Id. at 1351.
78. Id.
79. 335 So. 2d 128 (1976).
80. 335 So. 2d 134 (1976).
81. Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d at 131-32.
82. Id. at 132.
83. Id.
84. Atkins v. American Motor Corp., 335 So. 2d at 143; Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335
So. 2d at 134.
85. Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d at 134.
86. Id.
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tually compatible with traditional punitive damage doctrine and
probably could serve as the basis of a punitive damage claim in a
personal injury suit.
This brief survey of the decisions of courts which permit puni-
tive damage claims in products liability suits reveals that the pol-
icy arguments against punitive damages in strict products liability
cases have not been well received. Those courts offering a rationae
for allowing punitive damage claims in strict products liability ac-
tions uniformly accepted Professor Owen's thesis that punitive
damages effectively deter manufacturer misconduct.8 7 Fears of
pushing manufacturers to financial ruin through excessive damage
awards are unfounded if juries consider the factors of the defen-
dant's relative wealth and the degree to which it has been pun-
ished in prior lawsuits, and if judges closely control jury awards.88
The size of the awards upheld by these courts8 9 illustrates that the
courts are very serious about punishing manufacturer misconduct
and setting an example for other manufacturers through the puni-
tive damage remedy.
Whatever the particular standard for punitive damage recov-
ery, 0 certain types of manufacturer misconduct were punished
consistently. Premarketing knowledge of a product's dangerous
propensities coupled with a failure to warn consumers or reduce
the hazard,91 or postmarketing knowledge of product-related inju-
ries together with a failure to warn consumers, recall the product,
develop more accurate safety tests, or correct the defect 2 incurred
87. See notes 18, 23 & accompanying text supra.
88. See notes 24, 58, 78 & accompanying text supra.
89. Day involved a $500,000 award; Gryc, $1,000,000; Grimshaw, $3,500,000; Leichtamer,
$1,100,000; Moore, $10,000; Gillham, $100,000; Rinker, $460,000. See notes 21, 26, 37, 43, 44,
49, 54 & accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 19, 27, 35, 41, 46, 52, 59, 73 & accompanying text supra.
91. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., - Cal. App. 3d - 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981)
(manufacturer knew automobile gasoline tank was prone to explosion in rear-end collisions);
Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969) (manufacturer knew
high percentage of caustic soda in its drain-cleaning product was extremely dangerous),
aff'd, 46 Il. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727
(manufacturer knew its fabric, used in children's sleepwear, was highly flammable), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
92. See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (manufacturer knew of
injuries and deaths from defectively designed handgun), modified, 615 P.2d 621 (Alaska
1980); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969) (manufacturer
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heavy punishment. Manufacturers and defense attorneys may ar-
gue that the standards for punitive damage recovery do not give
adequate notice of unacceptable conduct,93 but they cannot mis-
take the determination shown by some courts to punish manufac-
turers who refuse to remedy the situation when they have notice of
a dangerous defect in their product.
Claims Permitted But Recovery Denied
Courts in other jurisdictions, including Tennessee, Arizona,
Texas, and California, also acknowledge that punitive damages
may be appropriate in strict products liability suits under certain
circumstances, but they so strictly apply the legal standards for
punitive damage recovery that plaintiffs seldom recover punitive
damage awards. In Johnson v. Husky Industries, Inc.,94 a wrongful
death action based solely on strict products liability, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit assumed without dis-
cussion that Tennessee courts would permit punitive damages in
strict products liability suits. Accordingly the court upheld the
submission of the punitive damage claim to the jury but set aside
the jury's award of $212,500.' 5 Tennessee law allowed punitive
damages m cases involving wrongful acts done "so recklessly as to
imply a disregard for social obligations, or where there is such will-
ful misconduct or entire want of care as to raise a presumption of
conscious indifference to consequences." 96 Applying this standard
of recovery to the facts of the case, the court held that the evi-
dence showing the inadequacy of the defendant's warning was in-
sufficient to support punitive damages as a matter of law.97
In d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co.9 8 the United States Court
knew of numerous injuries caused by exploding Drano cans), affd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d
103 (1970); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (manufacturer knew of children
suffering burns while clothed in its fabric), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980); Rinker v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. App. 1978) (manufacturer knew of numerous acci-
dents caused by broken fast-idle cams).
93. See, e.g., Coccia & Moorisey, supra note 6; Fulton, supra note 6; Hoenig, supra note
6.
94. 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976).
95. Id. at 650-51.
96. Id. at 650 (citing Inland Container Corp. v. March, 529 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tenn. 1975)).
97. Id. at 651.
98. 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977).
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also did not discuss the propriety
of punitive damages in a strict products liability case but assumed
that Arizona law would permit such a claim. In this suit, which was
based solely on strict products liability, the court applied the
"reckless indifference" standard of section 908 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts9" to determine whether the district court prop-
erly submitted the punitive damage issue to the jury.100 Although
the jury did not award punitive damages, 101 the Ninth Circuit held
that evidence showing the defendant's failure to test the product
adequately before marketing, and its misrepresentation of the
product's safety after it became aware of the dangerous defect,
would have supported a jury's finding of "reckless indifference."102
Pennsylvania also has adopted the Restatement standard for re-
covery of punitive damages. In Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,0 3 a
products liability suit based on strict liability, negligence, and
fraud in which the jury returned a general verdict, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania re-
fused to allow the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. On ap-
peal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that the district court should have permitted the punitive damage
claim,104 and that the jury should have decided whether the defen-
dant's warning of possible harm from its product was so inade-
quate as to reflect "reckless indifference" to the safety of
consumers.
10 5
On retrial plaintiff Hoffman alleged that the defendant had mar-
keted its product with actual knowledge of or wanton disregard for
its harmful effects.106 In a memorandum opinion, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled that
one plaintiff could not punish a defendant for the defendant's inju-
ries to all consumers.10 7 Noting that many other parties had filed
99. See note 19 supra.
100. 552 F.2d at 894.
101. Id. at 894 n.18.
102. Id. at 894.
103. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
104. Id. at 144-46.
105. Id. at 145-46.
106. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F Supp. 850, 855 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
107. Id. at 856.
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suit against the same defendant, the court stated that the purpose
of punitive damages was not to punish an outrage to society, but to
penalize the defendant for its conduct in relation to the particular
plaintiff.108 Thus, a plaintiff's punitive damage recovery must be
reasonably related to his recovery of compensatory damages. 10 9
Three years after Hoffman, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed a punitive damage
claim in Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,110 an ac-
tion based solely on strict products liability In the absence of rele-
vant Pennsylvania decisions, the court followed Hoffman and as-
sumed that no "per se preclusion" existed in Pennsylvania against
punitive damages in strict products liability cases."' Interpreting
the standard of section 908 of the Restatement,1 2 the court said
that a finding of "recklessness" required "a conscious choice on the
part of the alleged wrongdoer to act despite clear knowledge of a
highly probable risk of serious harm." 113 Mere negligence, or even
gross negligence, could not support a claim for punitive damages. 114
Applying this standard, the court found that the defendant had
failed to take steps to avoid a clearly foreseeable risk of harm but
had not realized fully the risk involved." 5 Because the manufac-
turer had not possessed the conscious awareness required by sec-
tion 908, the court set aside the punitive damage award. 116
Texas is another jurisdiction in which courts permit punitive
damage claims in strict products liability cases but apply the stan-
dard of recovery so strictly that punitive damages have not been
recovered. In Texas, punitive damage claims have been made only
m strict products liability suits involving wrongful death,"7 and
108. Id.
109. Id. at 857. This ruling reflects the concern of some scholars that a defendant poten-
tially liable to many plaintiffs should not be punished excessively. See note 24 supra.
The defendant settled the suit for $600,000. 18 AM. TRIAL LAW. A. NEWs LMTER 120
(1975).
110. 414 F Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
111. Id. at 264 n.13. The court also stated that it knew of no reason why it should disal-
low the punitive damage claim on policy grounds. Id.
112. See note 19 supra.
113. Id. at 266.
114. Id. at 267.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d
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the courts have allowed the claim on the authority of the Texas
Constitution, which provides that "[e]very person, corporation, or
company, that may commit a homicide, through willful act, or
omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in exemplary dam-
ages, to the surviving husband, widow, heirs of his or her body, or
such of them as there may be .... 11" Thus the Texas Constitu-
tion provides both the rationale for allowing punitive damage
claims and the legal standard for determining when they are
proper.
In Kntser v. Beech Aircraft Corp.," 9 a wrongful death action
based on strict products liability, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit held that under Texas law a finding of
"gross neglect" was precluded because the manufacturer had
warned consumers of possible defects in an aircraft fuel system.
Even though the warning may have been inadequate, the manufac-
turer's conduct was not the "conscious indifference toward the
public" that constituted the gross neglect sufficient to support a
claim for punitive damages. 20 The court held that in the absence
of evidence of a willful act or omission by the defendant, the dis-
trict court properly had refused to submit the punitive damage
claim to the jury. 21
In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 2 2 the Fifth Circuit applied the
same "willful act, or omission, or gross neglect" standard to reverse
a $10,000,000 punitive damage award in a wrongful death action
based on strict products liability. The court said that under Texas
law a showing that the defendant had exercised even "slight care"
would preclude a finding of gross neglect. 23 Accordingly, the man-
ufacturer's compliance with industry custom in designing a truck's
fuel system was the "slight care" that avoided gross neglect. 24
1008 (5th Cir. 1980); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); Heil Co.
v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
118. TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 26; see, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, 398,
reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
119. 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
120. Id. at 1097.
121. Id.
122. 623 F.2d 395, reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 398-99 (citing Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977)).
124. Id. at 399. The dissenting judge took issue with the majority's view that "slight
care" precluded a finding of gross negligence. He pointed out that in Atlas Chem. Indus.,
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Neither the Texas legislature nor judiciary has decided whether
punitive damage claims are proper in strict products liability suits
not involving wrongful death. In Newding v. Kroger Co.,125 an in-
jured plaintiff instituted a products liability suit on strict liability
and negligence theories. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals stated
that a punitive damage claim was proper as part of the plaintiff's
negligence action, and punitive damages could be awarded if the
plaintiff proved gross negligence.1 26 The court defined gross negli-
gence as an "entire want of care [that raises an inference] of a con-
scious indifference to the right or welfare of [others]."' 27 Applying
this standard to the facts of the case, the court held that, as a
matter of law, the manufacturer's failure to use a safer bottle cap
was not gross negligence. 128
When confronted with a punitive damage claim in a personal in-
jury suit based solely on strict products liability theory, the Texas
courts may choose to expand the holding of Newding and allow the
claim. If so, plaintiffs may expect to have their punitive damage
claims subjected to a strict application of the Texas standard for
punitive damage recovery
The California courts have taken an approach to punitive dam-
ages in products liability suits similar to that of Texas courts. Cali-
fornia courts allow punitive damage claims in strict products liabil-
ity actions, but they rarely permit recovery 129 In Barth v. B.F
Goodrich Tire Co.,130 a combined wrongful death and personal in-
jury action based on strict liability, negligence, and breach of war-
ranty, the jury returned a general verdict of liability, awarding
substantial compensatory but no punitive damages. The California
Court of Appeal held that the punitive damage claims of the per-
sonal injury plaintiffs were proper, but that because the California
Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975), the Texas Supreme Court had ruled that
evidence of "slight care" on the part of the defendant would not preclude an award of exem-
plary damages. The judge believed that the court should have followed Atlas Chemical
rather than Hernandez. 623 F.2d at 400-03 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
125. 554 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id. (quoting Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681, 688 (Tex. 1975)).
128. Id.
129. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., - Cal. App. 3d -, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981) is a major
exception. See notes 32-37 & accompanying text supra.
130. 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968).
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Code of Civil Procedure prohibited punitive damages in wrongful
death actions,13 1 the punitive damage claims of the wrongful death
plaintiffs should not have been permitted. 132 In Pease v. Beech
Aircraft Corp.,"s a products liability suit based on strict liability,
negligence, and fraud, the court of appeal held that although plain-
tiffs could not claim punitive damages in wrongful death suits,
they could recover punitive damages in survivors' actions because
the California Probate Code authorized punitive damages in such
suits.134 Thus, in California, punitive damage claims are appropri-
ate in strict products liability actions not involving wrongful death.
In products liability cases the California courts apply the stan-
dard for punitive damage recovery set forth in section 3294 of the
California Civil Code, which authorizes punitive damages when the
defendant's acts constitute "oppression, fraud, or malice."' 3 5 In
Pease, the plaintiff alleged fraud as the basis of his punitive dam-
age claim, but because of error in the jury instructions, the court
ordered a new trial on the issue of punitive damages.' In G.D.
131. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West 1973) provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another, his heirs may maintain an action for damages against the person
causing the death In every action under this section, such damages may
be given as under all the circumstances of the case, may be just, but shall not
include damages recoverable under Section 573 of the Probate Code, [that is,
punitive damages].
Id.
132. 265 Cal. App. 2d at -, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
133. 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974).
134. Id. at -, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 424. CAL. PROB. CODE § 573 (Went Supp. 1981) provides:
When a person having a cause of action dies before judgment, the damages
recoverable by his executor or administrator are limited to such loss or damage
as the decedent sustained or incurred prior to his death, including any penal-
ties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been enti-
tled to recover had he lived
Id. In California, as in most jurisdictions, a survivor's action is brought by the administrator
of the decedents estate against the tortfeasor to recover damages for the injury the dece-
dent himself suffered before death. A wrongful death action, on the other hand, is brought
by the decedents personal representative on behalf of dependents of the decedent who suf-
fered loss of support as a result of the decedents death. See D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDiES §
8.2 (1973); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTs §§ 126-127 (1971).
135. See note 34 supra.
136. Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 470, 474, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 427-32
(1974).
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Searle & Co. v. Superior Court,l1 7 a products liability suit based
on strict liability and negligence, the court of appeal stated that in
products liability cases the "malice in fact" required by the Civil
Code was a "conscious disregard of the safety of others."138 Using
this standard, the court found the punitive damage claim insuffi-
cient because it did not allege an "intent to injure" or a "conscious
disregard of the safety of others."139
The California Court of Appeal in Sabich v. Outboard Marine
Corp.140 discussed the burden of proof a plaintiff must sustain in
order to recover punitive damages. At trial the plaintiff alleged
strict products liability and fraud as theories of liability, and fraud
as the statutory basis for punitive damages.14' The jury returned a
general verdict as to liability, and awarded the plaintiff $600,000 in
compensatory and $1,254,000 in punitive damages. 42 The appel-
late court reversed the punitive damage award because the trial
court had not instructed the jury that the fraud required by the
Civil Code must be established by "clear and convincing" evi-
dence. 43 According to the court, this requirement would apply
with equal force to malice and oppression as bases for punitive
damages.14 4
These cases demonstrate that in California recovery of punitive
damages in strict products liability cases will depend on a clear
and convincing showing of oppression, fraud, or malice. In the
products liability context, a "conscious disregard of the safety of
137. 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975).
138. Id. at 31-32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
139. Id. at 32, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 225. The court stated that charges of wrongful, willful,
wanton, reckless, or unlawful conduct do not allege malice, and thus cannot support a puni-
tive damage claim. Id.
140. 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976).
141. Id. at _, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
142. Id. at _, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
143. Id. at _, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
144. Id. at _, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 711 n.4. The United States Department of Commerce's
Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (1979), calls for the same eviden-
tiary standard. Section 120(A) of the Act provides: "Punitive damages may be awarded
if the claimant proves by clear and convincing evidence that the harm suffered was the
result of the product seller's reckless disregard for the safety of product users, consumers, or
others who might be harmed by the product." Id. at 62748. In § 102(I), the Act defines
"clear and convincing evidence" as: "Proof that not only carries with it the power to
persuade the mind as to its probable truth or correctness of fact, but also has an additional
element of clinching such truth." Id. at 62720.
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others" will constitute malice in fact. The failure of most plaintiffs
to recover punitive damages indicates that the courts strictly apply
the legal standard and the burden of proof, perhaps reflecting Pro-
fessor Owen's concern that punitive damages be awarded only in
the clearest of cases. 145
This brief examination of decisions in jurisdictions that have al-
lowed punitive damage claims in strict products liability cases, but
have not permitted actual recovery, shows that the courts often do
not give any rationale for allowing punitive damage claims in the
strict products liability context.1 46 Those courts that do explain
their holdings base their allowance of punitive damage claims on
state constitutional guarantees, statutory provisions,14 s or the
absence of any indication that state law would prohibit such claims
in strict products liability suits. 14 9
These cases also show that the success of the plaintiff on the
punitive damage issue depends on how strictly the courts construe
the applicable standard for punitive damage recovery. For in-
stance, the Ninth Circuit in Maxey interpreted the "gross neglect"
standard narrowly by ruling that evidence of "slight care" by the
defendant precluded gross neglect as a matter of law.150 Similarly,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in Thomas read the state standard narrowly to require
actual awareness by the defendant that its product was causing in-
juries.1 51 Such strict interpretation of the standards for punitive
damage recovery requires the plaintiff to show very aggravated
manufacturer misconduct, a burden most plaintiffs have been una-
ble to meet.
In addition, to narrow construction of the punitive damage stan-
145. See Owen, supra note 17, at 1364-68.
146. See d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Johnson v.
Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d
132 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
147. See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008
(5th Cir. 1980); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973).
148. See Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974);
Barth v. B.F Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968).
149. See Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
150. See notes 121-23 & accompanying text supra.
151. See notes 110-16 & accompanying text supra.
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dards, plaintiffs in California must prove their entitlement to puni-
tive damages by "clear and convincing" evidence. The California
court explained that this burden of proof required a greater show-
mg than a "preponderance of the evidence," but somewhat less
than "beyond a reasonable doubt.'1 52 Most other jurisdictions
merely require that the plaintiff meet the "preponderance of the
evidence" burden of proof that is usual in civil cases. 153
Punitive Damages Claims Not Permitted
Only Louisiana courts have ruled that a plaintiff may not claim
punitive damages m a products liability suit. In Commercial Union
Insurance Co. v. Upjohn Co.,154 a products liability suit based on
strict liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's punitive damage
claim. The court stated that Louisiana law allowed only compensa-
tory damages in civil suits, leaving punishment to criminal stat-
utes. 55 Therefore, no plaintiff may claim punitive damages in a
products liability action governed by Louisiana law, no matter
what theory of recovery is involved. 56
SUMMARY
This Note has focused on two principal questions: are punitive
damages appropriate in a strict products liability suit, and, if so,
when are punitive damages warranted? Taken together, the deci-
sions examined in the previous sections indicate that most courts
152. See notes 140-44 & accompanying text supra. The "clear and convincing" standard
satisfies those scholars who argue that a punitive damage award is akin to a criminal penalty
and thus warrants a stricter burden of proof. See Kirscher, supra note 6. Some commenta-
tors argue that punishment is exclusively the responsibility of the criminal law, and awards
of punitive damages in a civil case, without the procedural safeguards of the criminal pro-
cess, violate the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. See Carsey, supra note 6; Ford, supra note 6.
153. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1979), modified, 615
P.2d 621 (Alaska 1980); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 739 (1980), cert.
dented, 101 S. Ct. 320 (1980).
154. 409 F Supp. 453 (W.D. La. 1976).
155. Id. at 458 (following Vincent v. Morgan's La. & Tex. R.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027,
74 So. 541 (1917)).
156. Id.
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hold that punitive damages are appropriate in strict products lia-
bility suits. The jurisdiction that automatically barred punitive
damage claims did so not because of any inherent conflict between
strict liability theory and punitive damage doctrine, or because of
reasons of public policy, but because the jurisdiction did not recog-
nize punitive damages M civil suits. 157 The majority of jurisdictions
have no general ban on punitive damages, and the courts in those
states hold uniformly that punitive damages may be claimed in a
strict products liability action.158
Not all courts permitting punitive damage claims offered reasons
to support their action.159 Typically these courts reviewed a multi-
theory products liability suit and a general verdict as to liability.
Even though the jury possibly had based its verdict on strict liabil-
ity theory alone, the court permitted the punitive damage award
without discussion. This silence may be taken as an implicit hold-
ing that punitive damages are proper in products liability suits re-
gardless of the theory of liability.
The federal courts that permitted punitive damage claims based
their holdings on state law allowing punitive damages in general
tort actions.1 60 The courts in d'Hedouville, Thomas, and Vollert
found no indication in the law of Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Ha-
waii that punitive damages would be prohibited in products liabil-
ity actions so they permitted plaintiffs to assert claims for punitive
damages.
The courts of Texas and California permitted punitive damage
claims in special cases pursuant to constitutional or statutory man-
date. ' 6 The Texas Constitution authorizes punitive damages in
157. See notes 153-56 & accompanying text supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 16, 23, 45, 49, 54, 61, 77, 94, 98, 104, 110, 119-23, 131-
34, 137-44 supra.
159. See Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Gillham v. Admiral
Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Hoffman v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Sabich v. Out-
board Marine Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 591, 131 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1976); G.D. Searle & Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 Cal. App. 3d 22, 122 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1975); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116
Ill. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
160. See d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1977); Thomas v.
American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Vollert v. Summa
Corp., 389 F Supp. 1348 (D. Hawaii 1975).
161. See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, reh. en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008
(5th Cir. 1980); Kritser v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 479 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1973); Pease v.
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wrongful death actions, 162 and California statutes permit punitive
damages in survivors' actions, but prohibit them in wrongful death
suits. 163 In these special cases the courts needed no additional rea-
sons to allow the punitive damage claims.
In the other cases, the courts offered explanations for their al-
lowance of punitive damage claims in strict products liability suits.
Adopting the arguments of Professor Owen, the courts of Minne-
sota, Alaska, Missouri, and Wisconsin stated that the traditional
goals of punishment and deterrence were needed as much in the
products liability field as in any other area of torts.6 4 The threat
of punitive damage awards would have a great deterrent effect in
situations where the continued sale of a defective product re-
mained profitable even after payment of compensatory damages to
injured plaintiffs. Additionally, punitive damages would further
the goal of law enforcement by providing an incentive to sue to
persons not seriously injured by a defective product.
The court in Drake refuted the argument that punitive damage
doctrine was inconsistent with strict liability theory by explaining
that a plaintiff can establish the elements of proof addressed to the
issue of strict liability and then make a supplemental showing of
aggravated manufacturer conduct to support the remedy of puni-
tive damages. 16 5 After this decision, other courts were not troubled
by the incompatibility argument."6 6
Finally, the courts that explain their decisions to allow punitive
damage claims reject the argument that punitive damages in prod-
ucts liability litigation will destroy socially useful enterprises by
pushing manufacturers into bankruptcy 167 The danger of overpun-
ishment can be minimized by careful attention in the measurement
of punitive damage awards to the manufacturer's financial status
and the degree to which it has been punished in prior suits.168 Fur-
thermore, should the jury award an excessive amount despite these
Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1974).
162. See note 118 & accompanying text supra.
163. See note 134 & accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 16-18, 22-23, 32-33, 54-57, 61, 64-67 & accompanying text supra.
165. See note 61 & accompanying text supra.
166. See notes 18, 23, 33, 67 & accompanying text supra.
167. See notes 66-68 & accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 25, 58, 66-67 & accompanying text supra.
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factors, trial and appellate judges can order a remittitur or grant a
new trial.16 9 Thus most courts take the overpunishment argument
seriously, but do not accept it as a reason to bar completely puni-
tive damage claims.
As for the question of when punitive damages are appropriate in
a strict products liability action, courts will allow an award only
when they are convinced that the plaintiff has met the legal stan-
dard for recovery The courts have not developed a new, more spe-
cialized standard for products liability suits, but rather have ap-
plied the jurisdiction's traditional standard for punitive damage
recovery in tort cases. Recovery of punitive damages depends not
as much on the wording of the particular standard as on the
court's construction of the standard. Generally, a narrow construc-
tion of any state standard will preclude a punitive damage recov-
ery, whereas a more liberal interpretation of a standard usually
will support a punitive damage award.170 Perhaps the best example
of how construction of a standard can yield different results is
found in Thomas and Day m Interpreting the identical standard,
"acts done with malice or bad motives or a reckless indifference to
the interests of another, '17 2 the court in Day held that "reckless
indifference" could include grossly negligent acts,173 but the court
in Thomas decided that negligence, no matter how gross or wan-
ton, could not constitute "reckless indifference. 17 4 In Day the
court affirmed the punitive damage award, and in Thomas the
court set aside the punitive damage award. If the same interpreta-
tion of "reckless indifference" had been applied in both cases, how-
ever, the results should have been identical.
Because of the varying interpretations given the standards for
punitive damage recovery by the courts, mere examination of the
standards themselves does not determine when punitive damages
will be appropriate in a strict products liability suit. A look at the
type of manufacturer conduct that courts most often punish may
suggest a more reliable answer. Courts punished premarketing be-
169. See note 58 & accompanying text supra.
170. See notes 67, 89, 150 & accompanying text supra.
171. See notes 16, 110 & accompanying text supra.
172. See note 19 supra.
173. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
174. See note 15 & accompanying text supra.
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havior when the manufacturer had reason to know of the danger-
ous propensities of its product but failed to test the product ade-
quately, take steps to reduce the hazard, or warn consumers of the
danger. 1"5 Moreover, large punitive damage awards were upheld
when a manufacturer had postmarketing notice of product-related
injuries and still failed to warn consumers, recall the product, or
correct the defect.176 Certainly a combination of such premarketing
and postmarketing behavior in any one case would present circum-
stances most likely to result in punitive damage recovery
Yet even a combination of premarketing and postmarketing mis-
conduct may not warrant a punitive damage award in all jurisdic-
tions. The defendants in Maxey and Gryc both knew of the danger
associated with their products even though they had complied with
industry custom and safety regulations in the design and manufac-
turing processes, and yet the courts punished only the manufac-
turer in Gryc.17 The different result is attributable to the different
standards applied by the courts of Texas and Minnesota. If Gryc, a
Minnesota case, had been decided under Texas law, the manufac-
turer's compliance with federal safety regulations very possibly
would have been the "slight care" that would have precluded a
finding of gross negligence, and punitive damages would not have
been recovered. 178
Whether punitive damages are appropriate in a particular strict
products liability suit depends on the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions
that have punished premarketing and postmarketing conduct in-
volving the manufacturer's failure to warn of or correct a known or
suspected dangerous defect in its product will continue to do so in
the future. Other jurisdictions that have allowed punitive damage
claims but denied recovery seem to require aggravated manufac-
turer conduct that borders on an intent to injure. In these jurisdic-
tions, a more specific answer to the question of when punitive
damages are warranted is impossible because the courts have not
yet been presented with an example of punishable manufacturer
misconduct.
175. See note 91 supra.
176. See note 92 supra.
177. See notes 29-31, 123 & accompanying text supra.
178. See note 123 & accompanying text supra.
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CONCLUSION
This Note has shown that most courts allow punitive damage
claims in strict products liability litigation. Those courts offering a
rationale to support their ruling state that punitive damages are
necessary to punish manufacturer misconduct and to deter similar
conduct in the future. Other courts permit punitive damage claims
on the authority of a state constitution or statute, and still others
offer no rationale at all. Only in Louisiana do courts automatically
bar punitive damage claims.
The decisions of the courts that upheld punitive damage awards
in strict products liability suits indicate that such awards are war-
ranted whenever the plaintiff meets the state standard for punitive
damage recovery. The types of manufacturer misconduct that
courts most often punish include premarketing knowledge of a
dangerous defect in a product, coupled with a failure to warn of or
correct the defect, and postmarketing notice of product-related in-
juries, along with a failure to warn consumers, recall the product,
or correct the defect. No doubt the courts will clarify further the
standard for punitive damage recovery as they continue to face pu-
nitive damage claims in strict products liability suits.
NADINE E. RODDY
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